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Forgetting the Subject 
Chri~ta Davis Acampora 
It is possible to live almost without memory, and to live 
happily moreover, as the animal demonstrates; but it is al-
together impossible to live at all without forgetting. 
-On The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life 
Why must the preying lion still become 'a child? The child 
is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a 
self-propelled wheel, a first movement, a sacred "Yes." 
-Thus Spoke Zarathustra 1: On the Three Metamorphoses 
Remembering is possible only on the basis of forgetting, 
and not the other way around. 
-Heidegger, Being and Time 
The subject of forgetting, generally, is intentionally marginalized in the history 
ofWestern philosophy. As paradigmaticallythe "science ofknowledge" or, more 
broadly, the "love of wisdom,n philosophy characteristically strives to grasp and 
preserve, to have and to hold forever, its objects of investigation and the fruits of 
its labor. Forgetting threatens such an enterprise. It indicates weakness, decay, 
and deficiency. From the perspective of moral philosophy, forgetting is not only 
an indication of cognitive inferiority; it is a potentially sinister apd reckless trait. 
FOrgetting is the nemesis of what advances philosophy's aims, namely remember-
ing. Thus, there should be little surprise that the history of philosophy does not 
elaborately treat forgetting, remaining focused on memorializing truth, good-
ness, and the fundambltal nature of reality. But does forgetting play a role in 
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garnering these very same goods that it appears to jeopardize? Nietzsche argues 
that it does. This is most clearly reflected in his account of the development of 
the individual and its significance in the growth and course of moral psychology. 
In forgetting the subject, Nietzsche endeavors to supply a new way of conceiving 
the subject that he thinks is more suitable to a metaphysics that would relinquish 
permanence, and he does this in such a way as to emphasize the significance 
and value of forgetting itself, which at the same time calls into question how we 
think about knowledge. Thus, Nietzsche's forgetting of the subject bears on the 
most central concerns in philosophy despite the marginal status of forgetting in 
its history and the marginal attention forgetting has received in the secondary 
literature on Nietzsche. 
To develop these points, this essay is divided into five sections. In the first, I 
selectively consider some prominent ideas about forgetting in the history of phi-
losophy. This section is useful for appreciating some of the ideas that Nietzsche 
exPlicitly addresses in his own work. The account also highlights certain ideas 
about philosophy itself, learning, and truth that continue to be embraced today. 
I briefly consider also how forgetting has been treated by several thinkers fol-
lowing Nietzsche in order to supply the basis for a later section that will treat 
how the significance of forgetting in Nietzsche's philosophy has yet to be fully 
appreciated. In the second part, I elaborate the role of forgetting in Nietzsche's 
account of the formation of the self. It draws on one of the more potent discus-
sions of forgetting in his works, and it is crucial to his account of the develop-
ment of human moral psychology. I argue that mistaking the role of forgetting 
in Nietzsche's account greatly affects whether one appreciates the end of the 
story he tells in the Genealogy and the possible future he envisions for humanity, 
namely how Zarathustra is supposed to facilitate the "overcoming'' ofhumanity. 
How this process is tied to the history of moralization is more elaborately ad-
dressed in the third section, which considers how Nietzsche connects the battle 
against forgetting with cruelty. Nietzsche specifically ties the torturous practices 
of mnemonics to the development of reason. I discuss the passages in Nietzsche's 
Genealogy where these ideas are introduced and then more fully develop those 
ideas in the broader context of Nietzsche's philosophy generally. In the fourth 
section, I claim that the idea of forgetting the subject provides a reflective basis 
for the development of an ecstatic logic that is compatible with Nietzsche's cri-
tique of Platonic metaphysics and the epistemological views it supports. By way 
of conclusion, I recap and emphasize what is lost in the continued marginaliza-
tion of forgetting not only in Nietzsche's works but als8 in philosophy generaHy. 
Finally, I suggest some paths for further pursuit. 
I. Forgetting History 
Of course, Nietzsche is not alone in the history of philosophy in reflecting on for-
getting, although his interest joins him to a rather sparsely populated community 
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of philosophers. Plato certainly stands out as concerned about forgetting, but 
the apparent views of his character Socrates have had a lasting influence on 
how forgetting has been pUshed to the margins of concern in philosophy ever 
since. The so-called theory of recollection is perhaps the best-known example of 
philosophical discussion that bears on the matter of forgetting. Recollection is 
supposed to account for how learning is possible at all. According to this view, 
learning is not a matter of being filled up with new things (a process that proves 
difficult to imagine and which has the consequence of presenting knowing as a 
passive process) but rather is a matter of recollecting what it is that one already 
has as contents of knowledge. The Meno's uneducated slave, who proves himself 
competent in geometry when appropriately prompted, is supposed to illustrate 
a case in point. We know, but don't always know that we know, many things, 
and education is aimed at educing such knowledge from us. We are constituted 
knowing, but have somehow forgotten. The task then of education and philoso-
phy more generally is to overcome this forgetfulness. 
One explanation ofhow we managed to forget what we already know, such 
that it needs to be brought out of us, is suggested in the Republic's Myth ofEr (an-
other is found in the Phaedrus). At the end of the long journey during which the 
transmigration of souls from one life to another is accomplished, the participants 
must cross the hot, dry plain of Lethe (literally "forgetfulness"), where they are 
given the opportunity to drink from a river. "All of them had to drink a certain 
measure of this water," we are told, "but those who weren't saved [sDizomenous] 
by reason drank more than that, and as each of them drank, he forgot every-
thing and went to sleep" (Republic 62la.1 Compare this line with 62lb in which 
Socrates tells Glaucon in explaining how Er returned to his body to tell the story, 
"And so, Glaucon, this is a story that was saved and not lost," in which the word 
esOthe appears. Both words translated as "saved" have the root sOzO, meaning to 
save, preserve, and remember. These multiple meanings are later exploited by 
Heidegger.) Presumably, variety in depth of intellection and ease of recollection 
can be explained, then, according to how much or what measure of water one 
drank from the river at Lethe. Those whose souls were not conditioned to ascer-
tain the measure that was appropriate (i.e., those without a sense of justice, those 
with less refined rational powers) drank too much and thus set for themselves a 
difficult course in their next lives. They will have already forgotten so much that 
recollecting will be difficult, and they will not be able to choose well the things 
that are worth pursuing in their new lives. Forgetting will make them morally 
degenerate and less happy. The goal of philosophy, of the exercise and enhance-
ment of the rational powers, the myth instructs us, is to avoid forgetting so that 
one may choose and fare well (eu prattOmen).l 
Two points ai'e worth underscoring at this juncture. The first is that this 
story reminds us of the etymology of the common Greek word for truth-
aJetheia-literally, non-forgetting, an idea to which I shall return shortly below. 
And the second is that there is at least another way of interpreting the upshot of 
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the myth as it relates to the significance of forgetting-drinking the water at Lethe 
was necessary; the fact of drinking was not itself the indication of weakness or 
degeneration. The problem, for those who fared poorly, was not that they drank 
at all but rather that they exceeded their reasonable measure. Thus, forgetting 
might yet play an important role in the formation of the basis of the lives that 
become ours (although this is not explained). If so, then the task of philosophy 
is to temper forgetting-not eliminate it-to keep it from exceeding its bounds. 
But this sense of forgetting from Plato's myth was not saved. 3 
forgetting doe.s appear much later in the history of philosophy, in the phi-
losophy ofSchopenhauer, as playing an important role in shaping the basis of our 
lives and ·sense of ourselves. Forgetting oneself is important for Schopenhauer, 
since that self that we think we are (on account of the principium individuatio-
nis) is merely a representation of will and not the effect of an independent will 
that we in essence truly are. "Forgetting [of] oneself as individual" is an impor-
tant insight for Schopenhauer and serves as the basis for being in a position to 
momentarily still the will whose cravings are the source of our suffering and 
dissatisfaction (Schopenhauer,l966, I:199; see also Parkes, 1994, pp. 60-89, esp. 
68ff for discussion of how this relates to Nietzsche's conception of subjectivity 
and forgetting, particularly in light of The Birth of Tragedy and the conception of 
Dionysian ecstasy [Rausch]. I more fully develop similar ideas in my section four 
below). For Schopenhauer, it is crucial to forget what was the most transparent 
and self-evident phenomenon for Descartes, the basis for all possible knowledge, 
namely the "1," or the self. Such forgetting is necessary not only for any possible 
happiness, for Schopenhauer, but also for our understanding of the truth of the 
way the world really is. 
As noted above, a dependency of truth on forgetting is saved in the Greek 
word aletheia. Truth conceived as nonforgetting at first glance appears to set up 
the two terms as polar opposites, as though they might be mutually exclusive 
or perhaps essentially contradictory. Indeed, this is how much of the history 
of philosophy has regarded the relation between truth (or wh~t is known) and 
what is forgotten (what is not known), but some modern philosophers have sug-
gested that such a view was not sh~ed by certain ancient Greek philosophers 
themselves, at least not the predecessors of Socrates. Heidegger, of course, makes 
much of this idea. In his effort to revive a sense of truth that he alleges has been 
forgotten since Plato, Heidegger emphasizes the significance of forgetting as a 
fundamental feature of human ontology and the understanding of some of the 
most basic philosophical questions. 
Quite unlike many of his predecessors, Heidegger gives prominence to 
forgetting when he writes that "remembering is possible only on the basis of for-
getting and not the other way around" (Heidegger, 1996, 11:4, §68). With this, 
Heidegger reiterates a predominant theme in his writings: human beings have 
forgotten Being. This resembles the Platonic idea ofhaving knowledge, or the truth, 
without realizing it until it is drawn out of us. (And given the way Heidegger 
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emphasizes truth as a kind of relationship or communion with Being and the way 
in which he conceives of the emergence of this relationship as an event, especially 
in his later writings, it might also be the case that Heidegger, like Plato, has his 
own mythos to go along with his conception of the relation between forgetting 
and remembering, too.) For Heidegger, we quite dearly have some understanding 
of Being-we do, after all, make claims about the existence of things and their 
character, and we convey such understanding not only in our use of language, 
but also in our use of things, in the way in which we interact with them in the 
world and the way in which they can become for us objects of care. Moreover, 
the very fact that we can even ask the question "What is Being?" suggests that 
we at least have some sense of what it is that we are seeking. But we fail to "save" 
{or remember) what we gather from the standpoint of interacting with beings in 
relations characterized by care. 
Part of the explanation for this forgetting is that such relations, which are 
themselves interpretations (for Heidegger, ways of taking something as some-
thing), do not yet rise to the level of a theoretical or conceptual understanding. It 
is dear that this is not a case of forgetting in the usual use of the term, although 
it could be a case of forgetting in the sense of not "saving" what we have been 
shown, which echoes somewhat the Platonic association of saving and remem-
bering.4 Heidegger's conception of phenomenology, as introduced in §7 of Being 
and Time, and his characterization of what he calls the "circle of understanding" 
(e~p. §§ 31-34) provide a basis for more fully elaborating this relation. Another 
explanation for forgetting, as Heidegger considers it, is that what is disclosed to us 
in our relations to things in the world gets forgotten or obscured (for Heidegger, 
"covered up") through the application of ready-made interpretations supplied by 
the history of metaphysics and the variety of ways in which it conceives ofbeing 
as itself an entity or thing and the commonplace adaptations of such metaphysical 
concepts that have made their way into everyday language. This influences not 
only how we relate to other entities in the world, including other human beings, 
but also how we relate to ourselves (our conceptions of self and what is meant by 
"I") and to the most basic philosophical questions that we can ask. The tasks of 
philosophy as they relate to forgetting, then, for Heidegger include: l) developing 
an understanding of human beings as fundamentally in a condition of forgetful-
ness (i.e., of not saving all that is potentially apparent to us), and 2) overcoming 
the forgetfulness that the history of philosophy has facilitated. 
I have given priority here to the ideas ofHeidegger because it seems to me 
that virtually no one after Nietzsche gives greater prominence to the idea of for-
getting than he, and Heidegger draws upon a number of the ideas that I have em-
phasized in the history of philosophy while at the same time developing his own 
-views on the matter. 5 There are a number of people after Nietzsche, who make 
mention of Nietzsche's emphasis on forgetting. Among them are Deleuze, Der-
. ' 
rida, and Kofman. I make mention of each of these in various sections below and 
do not include them in this survey section because their comments on forgetting 
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are generally brief or are made almost entirely in relation to making observations 
about Nietzsche's philosophy. Thus, I treat them as I reach the relevant point in 
my discussion of Nietzsche's view, to which I now direct my focus. 
II. Forgetting the Self 
It is already widely recognized that Nietzsche describes forgetting not as an ab-
sence or lack of memory but rather as an active force in its own right (GM II, 
§ 1). This feature of Nietzsche's philosophy has been briefly noted by numerous 
commentators and is emphasized indirectly in the work of Deleuze, who writes 
extensively about the significance of active forces in relation to reactive ones in 
Nietzsche's work (Deleuze, 1983, pp. 39-72).6 But how Nietzsche casts the nature 
of this activity and its vi~ity with regard to forgetting continues to be mischar-
acterized and misunderstood. Alan Schrift, writing of Deleuze's contributions 
to understanding Nietzsche's philosophy in terms of"becoming," ties active for-
getting to "the sovereign individual" (Schrift, 1995, p. 74), and this figure has 
played a prominent role in numerous other interpretations of Nietzsche's vision 
for the future ofhumanity. 
The figure of the sovereign individual makes its lone appearance in Nietz-
sche's corpus in the section of the Genealogy that immediately follows the one 
identifying forgetting as an active force. Schrift links forgetfulness, as it is as-
cribed by Nietzsche to "a form of robust health" in GM U, § l, with the power and 
freedom allegedly claimed and enjoyed by the sovereign individual as described 
in GM II, §. 2. According to this view, the first two sections appear thematically 
continuous: the entity described in the first section is the same as that described 
in the second. But the proximity of the passages is deceptive. In those few para-
graphs, Nietzsche provides a sweeping overview of a story of the moralization 
ofhumankind-ofthe production of"humanity," what Nietzsche also describes 
as the "animal with the right to make promises." He covers qmsiderable ground 
between his reference to the active force of forgetting and the so-called fruit that 
is the sovereign individual It is crucial that one appreciate that great distance if 
one is to understand the vision Nietzsche reaches toward at the end of the very 
same essay, in which he speculates about the future development of humanity, 
or what he at times designates as "overhumanity." In other words, to understand 
how. Nietzsche envisions the possibilities of overhumanity, one must understand 
the importance given to forgetting and how it stands in relation to what is said 
about the sovereign individual. 
The moral ideal that Nietzsche finds in the history of philosophy from 
Plato to Schopenhauer is one that increasingly prizes willing, and in so doing, 
ties it to responsibility, autonomy, and freedom: the greater one's exercise of will, 
the more complete one becomes, the more one realizes the real potential of hu-
manity, the more being, or actuality, one achieves. Acquiring the relevant form 
of willing to reach this ideal requires the development of memory, specifically 
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"memory of will" (GM II,§ 1). Such memory ls crucial for the establishment of 
what Nietzsche describes as a "long chain of will" in which the original "I will" 
(or the promise of ~orne action or deed) and "the actual discharge of the will," 
that is, the action or actions one actually undertakes, remain essentially bound 
despite changes of circumstance and the emergence of other desires and acts of 
will. Taking this on as a goal, human beings have cultivated powers of memory 
that significantly outstrip those of forgetting, and the service of this end has had 
dramatic secondary effects, including how one regards the past, present, and fu-
ture, and the expectations one has of others and oneself. In particular, what we 
might call the "memory project" requires certain dispositions toward the past 
and future and the necessity of securing, determining, and effecting it in such 
a way as to be in the position to maintain the "chain of will" mentioned above; 
all of this is needed to secure the conditions that make it possible to fulfill the 
promise made in the past and to make human affairs as regular and predictable 
as possible in the future in order to ward off circumstances that would interfere 
with the execution of the relevant actions dictated by the economy of prom-
ise-keeping. Nietzsche thus sees the telos of this kind of willing as inextricably 
bound with: 1) the development of reason, 2) a very peculiar sense of history and 
temporality, and 3) a philosophical anthropology in which "Man himself must 
first of all have become calculable, regular, necessary, even in his own image of 
himself, if he is to be able to stand security for his own future, which is what one 
who promises does!" (GM II,§ 1). 
The human being who stands security for his or her own future, though, is 
quite different from the creature with which GM II begins. That creature is de-
scribed in terms of being an animal, and although human beings certainly retain 
their animality for Nietzsche, they are nonetheless cultivated to such an extent 
that they are not merely animals or, at least, are animals that have been bred to 
distance themselves from those of other species. In Nietzsche's Genealogy. it is the 
development of conscience more than reason that distinguishes human beings, 
and the second essay in particular examines how such a conscience is produced 
and how it played a role in effecting the kind of animals modern human beings 
are. At the end of this process stands the ideal of "the sovereign individual": 
If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous process, where the ~ree 
at last brings forth fruit, where society and the morality of custom at last 
reveal what they have simply been the means to: then we discover that the 
ripest fruit is the sovereign individual, like only to himself, liberated again 
from morality of custom, autonomous and supramoral (for "autonomous" 
and "moral" are mutually exclusive), in short, the man who has his own 
independent, protracted will and the capacity to make promises [der ver-
sprechen darfl-and in him a proud consciousness, quivering in every 
muscle, of what has at length been achieved and become flesh in him, a 
consciousness o(his own power and freedom, a sensation of mankind 
come to completion. (GM II, § 2; Kaufmann and Hollingdale's transla-
tion emended) 
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The ideal of the sovereign individual is the goal or the ultimate fruit sought by 
the process of moralization and refinement of conscience. It is a serious mistake 
to read it as Nietzsche's ideal, for when one does so, one remains blind to the fact 
that the sovereign individual is the very ideal that Nietzsche seeks to replace and 
whose possible overcoming Zarathustra heralds. 
Emphasis in the critical literature on the centrality of the sovereign indi-
vidual obscures Nietzsche's emphasis on forgetting and its importance in hu-
man moral psychology in the second essay of GM. This is espectally so because 
those who are wont to emphasize sovereign individuality as Nietzsche's central 
counter image and ideal in the Genealogy also celebrate promising as the signatur~ 
feature of this ideal. But it is the demands of the economy of promise-making that 
have necessitated the development of memory (and secondarily reason) and the 
diminution of forgetting that Nietzsche thinks is responsible for the degenerate 
state of the "sick animals" we have become. Thus, some further scrutiny of the 
sovereign individual and how it stands in relation to forgetting is warranted. 
I have discussed problematic readings of the sovereign individual at greater 
length elsewhere (Acampora, 2004), so I shall only recap the most salient points 
of those arguments. For Nietzsche, pursuit of the ideal of the sovereign individual 
has produced creatures-that is, the animals we call human-who are in many 
respects dystrophic and dysfunctional. By emphasizing the activity of forgetting 
and its diminution in the process of enhancing the will, the second essay of the 
Genealogy commences an account of a struggle between two opposing forces: 
remembering and forgetting. Their relation can be thought of in terms similar 
to the agonistic dynamic of the artistic forces of the ApolJinian and Dionysian in 
The Birth ofTragedy. (l shall highlight one aspect of this similarity in later sections 
insofar as forgetting is linked with Dionysian self-forgetting and the disruption 
of the boundaries that remembrance establishes.) Just as our physical health de-
pends upon the accomplishment of nutrition through an active process of con-
sumption and digestion so does the formation of our psychic life occur through 
"inpsychation" (Einverseelung), which is achieved in the interactive processes 
of taking in experience and excreting what is unnecessary or undesirable to ab-
sorb. A disruption _of this catalytic dynamic of opposing forces risks dyspepsia. 
We can, Nietzsche claims, suffer from a kind of mental agita when our ability to 
"be done with" our experiences is compromised. Forgetting is important for this 
reason and numerous others that Nietzsche stresses elsewhere in his writings. 
The task of the second essay is to describe how this is the current human condi-
tion and to envision a way of restoring the health that has been compromised. 
The news is not all bad for Nietzsche: the "breeding of the animal given theca-
pacity to make promises" (GM II,§ I) that required the special strengthening 
of memory produced creatures that possess a peculiar capacity for willing. That 
capacity has tremendously creative possibilities, which is what makes human-
kind so interesting (GM 1, § 6). By the end of GM 11, Nietzsche essentially asks 
What now? ... How can we recover from the psychic dyspepsia of our moraliza-
tion in the deployment of the special capacity for willing we acquired along the 
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way? But we do not hear that question, and thus cannot pursue it along with or 
without Nietzsche's Zarathustra, if we remain fixated on the very activity that 
instigated our decadence, namely the atrophy of memory and the valorization 
of remembering that promising required. 
The value of forgetting also points toward a conception of the subject that 
is difficult to conceive and frequently ignored, namely one that is not a specific 
entity or essence but rather a composite of interacting forces. Nietzsche writes 
in GM II, § I, that forgetting is valuable and necessary because it allows for an 
evacuation of consciousness that frees it for other pursuits and preoccupations. 
This regulatory functioning is important because "our organism is oligarchically 
arranged." In describing the subject in this way, Nietzsche gestures backtoward 
ideas that he develops more elaborately in BGE, §§ 16-20, in which he challenges 
the metaphysics of subjectivity, the ways in which we conceive of selves and in-
dividuals, and how he described the mistaken ideas we have about subjectivity 
based on our projection of a "doer behind the deed" in GM I,§ 13: 
A quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of drive, will, effect-more, 
it is nothing other than precisely this very driving, willing, effecting, and 
only owing to the seduction of language (and of the fundamental errors 
of reason that are petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives all ef-
fects as conditioned by something that causes effect, by a "subject," can 
it appear. otherwise. [ ... ) there is no such substratum; there is no "being" 
behind doing, effecting, becoming; "the doer" is merely a fiction added to 
the deed [ ... ) Scientists do no better when they say"force moves," "forces 
cause," and the like- [ ... ] our entire science still lies under the mislead-
ing influence oflanguage. 
More will be said about the role of language below. For now it is important to 
notice that the idea of a free and sovereign individual of the likes described in 
the ideal identified at GM II,§ 2, is simply at odds with much else that Nietzsche 
conceives about individuality and how he conceives the subject. This ·lack of 
consistency between the radically free sovereign individual and what Nietzsche 
writes elsewhere about the subject is reason enough to be suspicious about taking 
it as Nietzsche's ideal. Combine that with the facts that the sovereign individual 
appears in no other place in Nietzsche's writings, that its signature character-
istic of promise-making is not touted as a laudable or distinguishing feature of 
nobility either in the Genealogy or in any ofNietzsche's other writings (indeed, 
one finds barely any references to making a promise at all in Nietzsche's other 
texts), and one has very little reason to believe (and certainly little ground to 
argue) that the sovereign individual is an important idea that Nietzsche wants 
to retain at all. 
So, what is the brief account of the sovereign individual describing if not 
a goal that Nietzsche seeks to pursue? Virtually every commentary on the pas-
sage in question emphasiZes the apparent strength of will of the sovereign, which 
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accounts for its freedom and is somehow realized in exercising its right to make 
promises (for my criticism of the translation of der versprechen darj. see Acam-
pora, 2004). But I find the conclusion of the passage more interesting and rel-
evant. What is it that makes the life of the sovereign individual desirable? How 
does it attract those inspired to pursue it? The real promise of the sovereign in-
dividual is a particularly powerful sensation: "a proud consciousness, quivering 
in every muscle, of what has at length been achieved and become flesh in him, a 
consciousness of his own power and freedom, a sensation of mankind come to 
completion" (GM II,§ 2). There is an aesthesis of power that courses through-
out the entire economy of promise-making-making promises, breaking them, 
and punishing others who are unable or unwilling to keep promises, and it is so 
great that humans have even instigated their own further deformity in the form 
of diminishing their powers of forgetting in order to pursue that feeling. The 
"sovereign individual" is a peculiar conceptual accretion formed by the gravi-
tational pull of the sensation of power that accumulates through the processes 
of cultivating memory and will to the degree that promising becomes not only 
desirable but also possible. It is a conceptual ideal that has oriented the pr«:>CCss 
of moralization, finally culminating in modern rationalistic accounts of human 
subjectivity. Modern individuals, for Nietzsche, have become something of mon-
strous creatures; the hypertrophy of reason is advanced by an undercurrent of 
the dystrophy of forgetting. 
Thus far, I have focused my discussion of Nietzsche's conception of the 
relation between subjectivity and forgetting on the idea that what we call the 
subject is formed through forces (Kraften) of remembering and forgetting and 
on how the formative influence of forgetting has been diminished. Elsewhere 
in Nietzsche's writings, he emphasizes the significance of forgetting in the pro-
cess of conceptualization more genera1ly: not only is our concept of the subject 
formed through an activity of forgetting, all concepts are, and this bears on how 
we regard the relation between our ideas and what they are supposed to identify 
and describe. 
Sarah Kofman emphasizes the role of forgetting in the activity of concep-
tualization. In Nietzsche and Metaphor, she elaborately describes how Nietzsche 
considers the formation of concepts as a metaphorical activity, an artistic and 
inventive process (hence not simply mirroring objects). Casting things in terms 
of concepts is a specialized form of metaphorical thinking. A distinctive fea-
ture of this kind of thought, however, is that we have forgotten its metaphorical 
nature. Moreover, in tying the conceptual to the true and the real, that which 
is acknowledged as metaphor, in contrast, has been cast aside as less desirable, 
less pure, derivative, and ultimately less powerful, a pale imitation or image of 
what truly is. 
Kofman makes much of NietzsChe's claim that the specialized language 
and conceptualization that philosophy utilizes is metaphorical, which we have 
forgotten is metaphorical: 
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Because of this fetishization of value, the fact that value is the product 
of evaluation gets forgotten, and the latter is now measured against the 
former; the fact that the concept results from a metaphorical activity gets 
forgotten, and it is taken for a transcendent model, with all specific things 
and actions being simply degraded copies or simulacra of it. The phantas-
matic construction of a transcendent world means that the genesis of the 
measuring standard gets forgotten. (Kofman, 1993, p. 44) 
The concept is based on metaphor, a metaphor of a metaphor, but it is judged as 
the standard and, thereby, as superior in relation to the metaphoric process from 
which it is derived, as itself proper. It forgets and denigrates its origin. The con-
cept is based upon forgetting in another respect, too, insofar as its insistence on 
sameness, regularity, and identity amounts to an active forgetting of differences 
(Kofman, chapter 3, "The Forgetting of Metaphor," passim). Thus, the process of 
conceptualization is itself a secondary metaphoric process that is itself derived 
from the original metaphoric grasping that characterizes human understanding 
and description of its experience. And this derivative, or secondary, metaphoric 
transformation works in such a way that it forgets-in the sense of extracting or 
refusing to recognize as significant-many differences, distinctions, and other 
possible features that might be further investigated or otherwise emphasized. 
Therefore, what we generally take to be the legitimate scrutiny of the world is 
actually a willful blindness to and intentional forgetting of many different as-
pects of our experience. 
Kofman emphasizes that Nietzsche replaces the traditional conception of 
humankind as rational animals with the idea of the human as the metaphorical 
animal (Kofman, pp. 2Sff). The shift does not signal that Nietzsche is tossing ra-
tionality to the wind or denying that it is a useful function of human cogllitive 
activity. Instead, he is claiming that what we identify as reason is but one-and a 
very specialized and, at times, narrow-kind of metaphorical activity, one that is 
not based solely on remembering, recollecting, or purely reasoning but in which 
much forgetting plays an active role. It is the capacity to engage in metaphori-
cal thinking generally and to direct our actions in light of such that is charac-
teristic of human being for Nietzsche. But humankind-committed as it is to 
its conception of humanity, the good as such, and the relentless reduction of all 
existence to conformity of what it calls reason-is currently experiencing a kind 
of stasis (e.g., z. Preface, § 3). What must we do in order to create something 
beyond ourselves, and what would it mean to "overcome man," as Zarathustra 
puts it and as Nietzsche anticipates it in On the Genealogy of Morals II, § 24 and 
throughout the third essay? 
The conception of the subject that drives the ideal of the sovereign indi-
vidual supplies a fundamental sense of boundary and containment. It serves as a 
primary metaphor that is extended and applied to our understanding generally; 
it supplies the formal Structure for extension of our other metaphorical activities 
and serves as a rule or g~ide for the assertion of limits and boundaries utilized 
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in cognition more broadly. It grounds a feature of reason that might very well be 
undermined if we developed a different conception of self. If we supplant the idea 
of the subject as responsible (remembering) agent, we might very well require and 
develop a different kind oflogic. (I shall return to this point in the fourth section 
below, where I discuss the role of forgetting in developing an ecstatic logic.) 
The overcoming of humanity involves overcoming, by reconsidering and 
reconceiving, our concept of humanity. This occurs not simply by redescribing 
or renaming the human. And it involves even more than revaluing humanity 
in the sense of asserting different ways of conceiving of the value of human life 
and the possibilities for human community. What the story of the sovereign 
individual from GM II, § 2, helps us to appreciate (once the roles of promising 
and remembering are better understood in their context) is the significance of 
the organization of desire in the specification of choice-worthy ends or ideals. 
Following the first two sections of the second essay of the G,enealogy that have 
been the main focus of this part of the paper, Nietzsche suggests a rather sinis-
ter motivation for the process of moralization that is guided by the ideal of the 
subject as a responsible agent, and he ties this to a history of the development 
of reason. It is to this genealogy that I turn ;iS prelude to discussions of the ways 
in which the reactivation and renewed cultivation of forgetting might facilitate 
the replacement of the concept of humanity that Nietzsche associates with such 
destructive ends and motives. 
Ill. Memory's Cruelty and the Development of Reason 
If further evidence is needed for Nietzsche's emphasis on the significance of for-
getting and the disaster that the emphasis on remembering has wrought, one 
need only consider the remainder of the second essay of the Genealogy. The rest 
of the essay is devoted to the history of the moralization of humanity, specifically 
the production of conscience and bad conscience. Conscience, Nietzsche claims, 
became possible through torturous processes of mnemonics that aimed to instill 
a sense of duty and obligation that required the extirpation of forgetting. What 
do we need in order to have a conscience? Nietzsche claims it fundamentally 
rests upon the cultivation of special powers of memory. "'How can one create a 
memory for the human animal? How can one impress something upon this in-
carnate forgetfulness, attuned only to the passing moment, in such a way that it 
will stay there?'" (GM II, § 3, translation emended). 
Nietzsche offers graphic examples ofhow "mnemotechnics" have been em-
ployed in the form of human sacrifice and mutilation: "all this has its origin in 
the instinct that realized that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics" ( GM 
II, § 3). It is clear that Nietzsche conceives quashing forgetfulness as the way in 
which ascetic practices achieved the fixity of their standards and norms. Mem-
ory was quite literally emblazoned in the psyche, initially by means of torture 
of the body, to render the ideals of asceticism "inextinguishable, ever-present, 
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unforgettable" and also to free "these ideas from the competition of all other 
ideas, so as to make them :unforgettable"' in the sense that there is no possible 
alternative to eclipse them or win out as desirable in comparison or contrast with 
them. Nietzsche writes, "the severity of the penal code provides an especially 
significant measure of the degree of effort needed to overcome forgetfulness and 
to impose a few primitive demands of social existence as present realities upon 
these slaves of momentary affect and desire" (GM II, § 3). So, a goal of ascetic 
mnemnotechnics was the permanent fixation of desire such that no other pos-
sible goal could even emerge on the horizon as one worthy of pursuit, much less 
as a potential rival. Again, Nietzsche's description of the techniques employed to 
acquire such direction of desire is quite graphic: the penal codes and sagas detail 
punishments involving flaying or boiling alive, trampling by horses, ripping the 
criminal body to shreds, piercing the body and cutting out the vital organs while 
the criminal is alive, stoning, crushing the skull on the wheel, and so on-and 
all of this in full public view. These practices have the purpose of producing a 
memory that contains "five or six 'I will not's' in regard to which one had given 
one's promise so as to participate in the advantages of society" (GMII, § 3). This 
is the brutal basis of promising that Nietzsche highlights, and he thinks it also 
serves as the primal basis of reasoning: "it was indeed with the aid of this kind 
of memory that one at last came 'to reason'!" (GM II,§ 3). 
Nietzsche's anticipated overcoming of humanity, which I have suggested 
~ight include reassignment of the boundaries of the self and its attendant con~ 
ception of reason, might also be seen as an overcoming of the torture and cru~ 
elty that lie at reason's fundamental basis. lit this sense, crossing the boundaries 
that were erected in forging the ideal of the sovereign subject signals not only a 
kind of liberation but also, at least potentially, a new kind of compassion or, at 
least, relief from prospective torture that the further "advancement" of reason 
might require. Forgetting the subject could entail foregoing the brutality of the 
practices that served modern processes of subjectification. 
IV. The Freedom of Forgetting: Ecstatic Logic and History 
Near the end of Derrida's 1968lecture "The Ends of Man," he identifies the spirit 
of a disruptive form of critique of the concept ofhumanism in Nietzsche's idea of 
active forgetting, linking it to the laughter of the lion in Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
(although Nietzsche himself associates forgetting with the figure of the child). 
The lion does not violently destroy but, rather, radically forgoes by ferociously 
laughing at its opposition. Derrida writes: "His laughter then will burst out, 
directed toward a return which no longer will have the form of the metaphysi~ 
cal repetition of humanism .... He will dance, outside the house [of Being, as 
Heidegger describes it], the aktive Vergesslichkeit, the 'active forgetting' and the 
cruel (grausam) feast of which the Genealogy of Morals speaks" (Derrida, 1982, 
p. 136)? It is worthwhile iO consider this link between active forgetting and the 
i i 
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kind of ecstasies it provides, the way in which it effects its outside once the scope 
of consideration is expanded beyond the Genealogy. Nietzsche's emphasis on the 
Dionysian and his earlier reflections on history indicate important connections 
between forgetting and the kind of freedom it can provide. 
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche associates the Dionysian with the dis~ 
solution of boundaries, a forgetting of the self, and the basis for an alternative 
way of symbolically interpreting what it means to be a human being, to have a 
human body, and to live a human life. It is interesting to observe how the idea 
of forgetting the subject is described and elaborated-das Subjective zu vOlliger 
Selbstvergessenheit hinschwindet (BT, § 1). The Dionysian is not simply a breaking 
of boundaries, an absence of self, or a sheer loss of measure. As Nietzsche identi~ 
fies the features of subjectivity that are dissolved in Dionysian self~ forgetting, he 
also draws attention to a joining, or union, with something else, to the realization 
of some other possibility that is not a part of ordinary human subjective experi~ 
ence. Two exemplary passages will have to suffice. In the first, Nietzsche indicates 
that the Dionysian is emblematic of the possibility of forgetting definitive human 
characteristics, such as walking upright and the use of verbal language: "In song 
and dance man expresses himself as a member of a higher community; he has 
forgotten [verlernt] how to walk and speak and is on the way toward flying into 
the air, dancing" (BT, § 1). This prospectively connects one to amore~than~human 
community of other living beings, grounding other ways of meaningfully inter~ 
acting with them as one shares in their expressive and locomotive possibilities. 
A second passage suggests a different relation to the human community that we 
ordinarily take as our own: "The dithyramb is thus essentially different from all 
other choral odes. The virgins who proceed solemnly to the temple of Apollo, 
laurel branches in their hands, singing a processional hymn, remain. what they are 
and retain their civic names: the dithyrambic choric is a chorus of the .transformed 
[Verwandelten] whose civic past and social status have been totally forgotten" 
(BT. § 8, translation emended). This characterization of Dionysian possibi1ities 
envisions forgetting (or forgoing) two further defining characteristics of human 
community: civic identity and social standing. The Apollinian standpoint strives 
to remain and retain; the Dionysian conjures a different set of possible relations 
among human beings, ones that are not principally organized along Apollin~ 
ian lines. Thus forgetting is not simply a loss. In The Birth of Tragedy and in the 
numerous other discussions of the Dionysian elsewh~re in Nietzsche's writings, 
forgetting is liberating not only because it frees one from certain claims and ties 
but also because it frees one to form new associations and different affiliations, 
to have, gain, or save what would not be had otherwise. 
There are two further points about forgetting that I wish to briefly mention, 
both warranting more elaboration than such a brief paper allows: 1) the relevance 
of forgetting in the formation of basic concepts that also inform how we conceive 
of the character and place of logic (anticipating what others have described as 
"ecstatic logic") and how this supplies important critical tools, and 2) the way in 
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which Nietzsche ties forgetting to the definition and formation of the subject (i.e., 
that he does not simply valorize formlessness or meaninglessness). Introduction 
of these themes provides a basis for the condudirig discussions of how Nietzsche 
considers forgetting as a condition for the possibility of happiness and goodwill 
toward others and of how forgetting might bear on other issues in moral and 
social philosophy even if one would rather leave Nietzsche behind. 
An ecstatic logic is one that investigates and interrogates or challenges 
the terms upon which logic unfolds and proceeds. (It is one of the two kinds of 
critique at issue in Derrida's discussion at the conclusion of "The Ends of Man" 
[e.g., p. 135]). It questions, or contests, the foundations oflogic and the basic con-
cepts upon which it rests. An ecstatic logic does not simply "stand out" oflog~c 
in a flight into the irrational or illogical; rather, it is one in which the terms of 
development, conflict, incorporation are potentially themselves transgressed, 
reoriented, in play (and accounts for Nietzsche's association of forgetting with 
the child rather than the lion in Z). One "stands out," achieves ekstasis, not sim-
ply through a rejection of logic but through an interrogation of the foundations 
of logic (the reflective ground that logic itself might not provide). Overcoming 
such challenges might result in a redefinition of the very terms upon which logic 
progresses. This appears to be, at least in part, what Nietzsche has in mind in his 
conception of the relation of the Apollinian and Dionysian with regard to the 
dynamic of erecting boundaries and distinctions and then erasing, annihilating, 
or transgressing them in the course of the Apollinian-Dionysian agon. 
I have emphasized the connection between the Dionysian and the forget-
ting of measure in The Birth of Tragedy, claiming that it is more than a sheer 
celebration of liberation from claims of reason, more than just the absence of 
any boundaries. This point requires further elaboration, which I can only be-
gin here. (For an excellent account ofthe place of measure in Nietzsche, see 
Van Tongeren, 2002. One also finds a stunning and sweeping account of the 
significance of the measureless [das Masslose1 and ecstatic logic in Sallis, 1991, 
although I think the relation between das Masslose and restraint needs yet more 
explanation and emphasis.) The selfless Dionysian appears to be fully liberated: 
free from the limitations associated with confinement within boundaries of the 
modern conception of subjectivity, free of the values and standards that issue 
from that determination. I write "appears" because this kind of freedom, which 
I take the early Nietzsche to find rather provocative but fundamentally unsatis-
fying, seems to be nearly exclusively negative. I think even the early Nietzsche 
takes it to be also meaningless. To make "the crossing into the abyss" toward 
which the Dionysian draws us is to completely lose ourselves insofar as we lack 
any relative relation in light of which the transgression of the boundary has any 
significance. Without such context it disables or disengages the norms it breaks, 
but Nietzsche envisions such crossing as also enabling and engaging possibilities 
for reformation and re-creation. Meaningful freedom for Nietzsche has both the 
negative and this positive· aspect. 
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The formatiVe role of forgetting in the shaping of the subject and its possi-
bilities for happiness and concern for others are described in relation to our desire 
to remember and memorialize in Nietzsche's On the Uses and Disadvantages of 
History for Life (hereafter HL). For now, I wish to focus on the formative process, 
deferring the rest for discussion below. Although Nietzsche describes the forget-
ting of the Dionysian in The Birth of Tragedy as in opposition to the plastic powers 
of the Apollinian, in HL he describes forgetting as intimately tied to the exercise 
of plastic powers, which he defines as "the capacity to develop out of oneself in 
one's own way, to transform and incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign, 
to heal wounds, to replace what has been lost, to recreate broken moulds" (HL, 
p. 62). Too much remembering can become meaningless and stultifying: 
Imagine the extremest pos~ible example of a man who did not possess the 
power of forgetting at all and who was thus condemned to see everywhere 
a state ofbecoming: such a man would no longer believe in his own being, 
would no longer believe in himself, would see everything flowing asunder 
in moving points and would lose himself in this stream of becoming .... 
Or, to express my theme even more simply: there is a degree of sleepless-
ness, of rumination, of the historical sense, which is harmful and ultimately 
fatal to the living thing, whether this living thing be a man or a people or a 
culture. (HL, p. 62) 8 
Forgetting, it seems, is an important condition for experience-important for 
giving the shape, form, rhythm, texture, and depth that make the seemingly 
endless streain of possible objects of concern and attention an experience, to 
recall Dewey's famous distinction. This occurs not simply by piling up experi-
ences but also by taking some away, by encouraging some to fade, recede, fall 
away. Forgetting in this sense grants rather than evacuates or eliminateSi too 
much remembering leaves us with experience without pause and strips from us 
possibilities for action. 
What determines the limit, the degree to which forgetting is necessary, the 
point at which remembering becomes poisonous? After all, too much forgetting 
is also dangerous. Strength and health are characterized by the capacity to ef-
ficiently and creatively incorporate experience; "that which such a nature can-
not subdue it knows how to forget" (HL, p. 63). This conception of the relation 
between forgetting and the formation of the subject resonates with Nietzsche's 
account of "inpsychation" in the dynamic of forgetting and remembering- in 
GM ll, § 1. which he also compares with processes of nutrition. In HL he puts it 
thus: "a living thing can be healthy, strong and fruitful only when bounded by 
a horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a horizon around itself, and at the same 
time too self-centred to enclose its own view within that of another, it will pine 
away slowly or hasten to its timely end"' (HL, p. 63). The human needs to be "'just 
as able to forget at the right time as to remember at the right time" (HL, p. 63). 
Nietzsche continues the theme later in the essay when he writes, "Sometimes, 
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however, this same life that requires forgetting demands a temporary suspen· 
sion of this tOrgetfulness; it wants to be dear as to how unjust the existence of 
anything-a privilege, a caste, a dynasty, for example-is, and how greatly this 
thing deserves to perish. Then its past is regarded critically, then one takes the 
knife to its roots, then one cruelly tramples over every kind of piety,. (HL, p. 76). 
Critical history is an example of remembering at the right time. 
Forgetting is important for monumental history, for creating the possibil· 
ity for some things to stand out as exceptional by letting other things fall away, 
but it is also important that monumental history not rule or dominate the other 
modes (antiquarian and critical). It is not simply a willful fictionalizing of all 
history, for when that happens "the past itself suffers harm: whole segments of 
it are forgotten, despised, and flow away in an uninterrupted colourless flood" 
(HL, p. 71). What Nietzsche advocates instead is the cultivation of a sense for the 
"unhistorical." He explains: 
With the word "the unhistorical" I designate the art and power of forgetting 
and of enclosing oneself within a bounded horizon; I call "suprahistorical" 
the powers which lead the eye away from becoming towards that which 
bestows upon existence the character of the eternal and stable, towards 
art and religion. Science ... hates forgetting, which is the death of knowl-
edge, and seeks to abolish all limitations of horizon and launch mankind 
upon an infinite and unbounded sea oflight whose light is knowledge of 
all becoming. (HL, p. 120) 
Thus Nietzsche reaches conclusions about the relation between forgetting and 
remembering, having limits and being free, and being and becoming that are at 
odds with much of the tradition and even certain strands of his other thinking. 
Nietzsche's readers would expect him to praise a perspective that appreciates 
becoming and prioritizes it over being, but in HL Nietzsche describes how such 
genuine appreciation is actually thwarted and suggests that our ap~rehension of 
being, made possible when we can "pause" experience by letting some of it drop 
out from its stream, is a condition for the direction of our actions and our assess-
ments of our possibilities. Too much remembering actually makes us less able to 
know or to hold on to experiences such that they can stand out as meaningful. 
But too much forgetting is also detrimental, particularly in light of our possibili-
ties for freedom. Although forgetting superficially promises freedom, Nietzsche 
argues that the conditions of meaningful freedom are realized in an interactive 
dynamic in which remembering and forgetting each play a role in constituting 
the subject, enable it to incorporate its experience, and reconstitute it in light of 
what it has been and might possibly become. 
I previously noted that in HL, Nietzsche further claims that forgetting is 
important both for our happiness and our ability to attend to the well-being of 
others. His On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life opens with a medita-
tion on this theme. Nietz~che writes, "In the case of the smallest or of the greatest 
happiness. however, it is always the same thing that makes happiness happiness: 
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the ability to forget .... He who cannot sink down on the threshold of the moment 
and forget all the past ... will never know what happiness is-worse, he will never 
do anything to make others happy" (HL, p. 62; my emphasis). I take Nietzsche to 
mean that our happiness is not achieved simply by balancing out pleasures and 
pains. The sheer joy we take in the affiliation with loved ones, for example, is not 
founded upon balancing or canceling out the hardships we have also shared with 
them. Our joy in companionship does not simply bubble up occasionally out of 
a context in which we equalize and then exceed the despair we have also shared. 
Joy rushes out from a moment when suffering is forgotten, and in that moment it 
is as though our pains never existed at a11. Our pleasures and pains differ not only 
quantitatively, or in degrees of intensity, but also qualitatively, with differences in 
kind. Some pains that we suffer simply cannot be canceled or balanced by past or 
future pleasures-the death of a child, the witnessing of torture and humiliation 
of others, the long slow pain of debilitating illness. Were it not for forgetting, joy 
following such experiences would be simply impossible. Forgetting is significant 
for our attention to the happiness of others, too, Nietzsche claims, and it is this 
relevance to the possibility of community that I want to briefly highlight as one 
of the ways in which Nietzsche's meditations on forgetting might be relevant to 
other concerns in moral and social philosophy. 
Y- Forgetting Ourselves and Saving Community 
Insofar as forgetting the subject potentially supplies us with different possibili-
ties for conceptualizing human subjectivity and individuality, as argued above, 
it may be rel~vant to resolving certain tensions in moral and social philosophy 
that pit the interests of the self and its autonomy against the interests _of others 
and their claims on us for assistance and nurturance. It might very well be that 
different possibilities for conceiving and resolving these tensions open when 
seen in light of a different conceptual basis of subjectivity. We find similar rela-
tions between alternative conceptions of selves and different social and moral 
possibilities, for example, in care ethics and its conception ofthe relational self, 
and the compassionate basis of Buddhist ethics and its "no-self" model. What 
different possible ethics might we be able to conceive in saving the forgetting 
of subjectivity? 
Forgetting the self in the ways I have suggested above might soften the rigid 
boundaries of the dominant view of the self and provide more porous access to 
a shared basis of human subjectivity and recognition of fragility. For a possible 
connection between such a subject and an ethics of generosity, see Cixous and 
Clement (1986; see also Schrift, 1995, pp. 82-101). Although I cannot engage this 
literature in this paper, I do think that the nature of forgetting that happens in 
the alternative logic of the economy of the gift, as it is described, needs further 
exploration. The character of such forgetting is not fully developed in the work 
of Cixous and Clement, and it is toward such a project that I think Nietzsche's 
work might make useful contributions. 
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In his book on the phenomenology of remembering, Casey (1987) argues 
that an emphasis on the overcoming of forgetfulness in the modern tradition 
results in an even greater forgetfulness (or marginalization) of remembering 
than does forgetting itself. But perhaps the diminution of forgetting is tied to 
the problem of failures of recognition and granting {and hence to coping and 
understanding) of the fragility ofhuman existence. Lest we think we have passed 
through the age of cruelty (in the formation of mnemonics}, we might give further 
consideration to the idea that the marginalization of forgetting in the conceptu-
alization of the significance of remembering is also tied to how we conceive the 
objects of our concern (human and otherwise) in terms of control, domination, 
power, which Heidegger and many others explore. Our conceptions of forgetting 
bear on these discussions, which have further implications and applications in 
our moral and social philosophies. 
Casey also emphasizes the significance of remembering for building com-
munity and notices that the disappearance of remembering demotes the role. of 
elders (Casey, 1987, p. 7). Drawing on the ideas elaborated here, we might also 
say that the marginalization of forgetting also demotes the value of the elderly in 
our society. They are forgotten, in part, because it is believed they have nothing 
valuable to contribute (inferior as "storage" devices to books, movies, COs, etc.), 
and because they are feared as the emblems of forgetting. In a social context in 
which a characteristic of human existence is defined in terms Of being an effi-
cient manager of memory storage, the sluggishness or inability of the elderly to 
engage in memory retrieval results in a perceived loss of humanity. If forgetting 
is replaced at the center of our conception of humanity, its appearance in our 
everyday lives and in the macrorhythms of human life more generally might ap-
pear less monstrous and afford different possibilities for how we relate to persons 
who appear to have a surplus of forgetting. 
Nietzsche's praise of forgetting should by no means be taken as a dismissal 
or denigration of remembering (notice the point about critical history and the 
formation of boundaries and horizons that the dynamic of remembering and 
forgetting makes possible). As I have argued, forgetting the subject is not simply 
a celebration of mindlessness or oblivion. Nietzsche's emphasis on the activity 
of forgetting and its implied interactive context (as a formative force shaping 
the individual, analogous to the formative forces of the Apollinian and Diony-
sian in BT) suggests that the forgetfulness of forg~tting, the marginalization of 
forgetting bodes ill for remembering, too. Delving a bit further into the analogy 
indicated in the Apollinian and Dionysian in BT is a worthy point of departure. 
Just as forgetting the Dionysian resulted, for Nietzsche, in the deformity of the 
Apollinian, so too does the forgetting of forgetting result in the transmogrifi-
cation of remembering. Our conceptualization of these two possibilities is inti-
mately related, and these conceptual formations give shape to and organize our 
practices in the world, thereby giving structure to how we relate to each other · 
and other objects of concern. 
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Notes 
1. For translations of Nietzsche's texts, I use Hollingdale's HL, Kaufmann's B1' and 
Z, and Kaufmann and Hollingdale's GM, unless otherwise indicated. 
2. The famous ending of the Republic is worth recalling: "And so, Glaucon, the tale 
was saved, as the saying is, and was not losl. And it will save us if we believe it, 
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and we shall safely cross the River of Lethe, and keep our soul unspotted from the 
world. But if we are guided by me we shall believe that the soul iS immortal and 
capable of enduring all extremes of good and evil, and so we shall hold ever to the 
upward way and pursue righteousness with wisdom always and ever, that we may 
be dear to ourselves and to the gods both during our sojourn here and when we 
receive our reward, as the victors in the games go about to gather in theirs. And 
thus both here and in that journey of a thousand years, whereof I have told you, 
we shall fare wel1 [eu prattOmen]." 1 n his discussion of nobility as it relates to its 
essential activity (in contrast to the reactivity of slave morality) in GMI. § 10, Nietz-
sche writes, .. they likewise knew, as rounded men replete with energy and there-
fore necessarily active, that happiness should not be sundered from action-being 
active was with them necessarily a part of happiness (whence eu prattein takes its 
origin)-all very much the opposite of' happiness' at the level of the impotent, the 
oppressed, and those in whom poisonous and inimical feelings are festering, with 
whom it appears as essentially narcotic, drug, rest, peace, 'sabbath,' slackening of 
tension and relaxing of limbs, in short passively." The assoc:iation in Nietzsche of 
forgetting with a kind of activity (GM II,§ 1), one crucial for happiness (e.g., HL, 
p. 4 and GS, "Jokes,n § 4) echoes in this passage. 
3. Forgetting is not the only process that has been rendered passive. Edward Casey 
(1987) explores how the contemporary conceptualization of memory as instrumen-
tal and as part of an essentially passive process has its roots in the philosophies 
of Plato (where remembering becomes instrumentalized) and Aristotle (where it 
becomes construed as something passive). Nietzsche's point seems to be that both 
forces, remembering and forgetting, are active and involved in an interactive dy-
namic that facilitates or grounds our distinguishing, valuing, or coming tO know 
things. 
4. Ultimately, Heidegger's view represents quite a departure from the Platonic sketch 
offered above. Insofar as Heidegger thinks that truth is a relationship and an ac-
tivity of disclosure, remembering what has been forgotten is a way of relating to 
things in the world rather than the retrieval oflost knowledge. 
5. Those interested in reviewing a collection of the few occasional remarks about 
forgetting that are made by modern philosophers in particular might find Seidel 
1966, pp. 81-98, of some use. Seidel's work on the nature of mind and consciousness 
is now rather dated, but his general thesis about the relation between forgetting 
as providing a reservoir of resources for creativity and his historical observatio~s 
might be helpful to those pursuing relevant topics. There is also some brief discus-
sion of forgetting in the history of philosophy in the context of a more elaborate 
account of the history of remembering in Casey 1987. I make only a few references 
to this work below, but it certainly would repay further study for those interested 
in the themes of this paper. 
6. Deleuze (1983) argues that Nietzsche distinguishes forces only in relation to quan-
tity and that active and reactive forces differ with regard to whether they obey or 
command in relation to each other (e.g., pp. 39-40). Consciousness is the work 
of reactive force: "Consciousness merely expresses the relation of certain re~ctive 
forces to the active forces which dominate them. Consciousness is essentially reac-
tive; this is why we do iiot know what a body can do, or what activity it is' capable 
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of(GS, § 354). And what is said of consciousness must also be said of memory and 
habit .. (p. 41}. In contrast, .. The body's active forces make it a self and define the 
self as superior and astonishing: ·A most powerful being, an unknown sage-he 
is called the Self. He inhabits your body, he is your body' (Z I, 'Of the Despisers of 
the Body,' p. 62)., (Deleuze, p. 42). If we map these to Nietzsche's.discussion of the 
role of memory in the creation of consciousness, remembering is cast as a reacti've 
force while forgetting is the active force that is responsible for the creation of the 
subject more generally. In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari offer some further 
elaboration of this idea of the active forces forming the self, particularly in rela-
tion to forgetting when they attribute to Nietzsche the idea that (in relation to the 
creation of the body as specified and articulated in terms of its parts, organs, and 
functions, and therefore accountable in a system of desire and exchange) "iL is a 
matter of creating a memory for man; and man, Who was constituted by means 
of an active faculty of forgetting (oubli), by means of a repression of biological 
memory, must create an other memory, one that is collective, a memory of words 
(paroles) and no longer a memory of things, a memory of signs and no longer of 
effects. This organization, which traces its signs directly on the body, constitutes 
a system of cruelty, a terrible alphabet" (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, pp. 144-145). 
What I take this tO mean is that our sense of ourselves as human beings, as hav-
ing specifically human bodies and being specific human individuals, stems from 
actively forgetting many facets and aspects of our bodies that we share with other 
nonhuman animals. There is a process of carving up the body inlo parts that is 
necessary for fitting them into a system of significanCes and meanings of what 
constitutes our humanity and to what we would do well to aspire (Deleuze and 
Guattari, p. 143). 
7. Derrida's lecture begins with a call for a more attentive history of the development 
of concepts, and he considers in greater detail the development oft he idea of"the 
human" (or, the concept "man") in phenomeno1ogy, particularly in Heidegger's 
works. He distinguishes two ways to critically evaluate and challenge philosophi-
cal frameworks that supply the basis for conceptual economies (concepts that are 
basic for others and are crucially interrelated). One critical approach works from 
"within," attempting to open and expand the existing framework, and the other 
approach works from "without" by seeking to abandon the rejected framework 
and to effect a complete and total dissociation from it. Both risk failure insofar as 
the first may well remain blind to what lies outside of itself and which could never-
theless be useful for the expansion and change it hopes to bring about. The second 
critical apprOach risks failure insofar as it insists upon its absolute distinction to 
such an extent that it might not recognize essential similarities that it holds and 
adopts rather naively and might not subject those features to a thorough-going 
critique (Derrida 1982, p. 135). Derrida associates Heidegger's work with the first 
· kind of strategy and his own contemporary French thinkers with the second. He 
appears to include Nietzsche in the second group as well, and it is at this point that 
he brief1y mentions Nietzsche's idea of active forgetting as described above. 
8. Some commentators and persons who asked questions when I gave earlier ver-
sions of this paper at conference meetings objected that Nietzsche does not really 
praise forgetting, recalling that as Nietzsche writes in HL, even animals forget; 
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what distinguishes us as humans is that we remember. I shall not address whether 
this is literally true since it is not relevant to the present discussion or the broader 
question of whether it is good for us to remember so much as we do, or to prize 
memory of a certain sort as highly as we do and for the reasons that we do. It is 
dear from this passage in HL that Nietzsche thinks that forgetting is essential to 
vitality. Others further object that if Nietzsche has in mind a renewal of forget-
ting it must he a kind that is different from that of animals. This also strikes me 
as unsupported. While many readers might be keen to distinguish human beings 
as essentially different from all "other animals,"' Nietzsche is not. I am not mak-
ing a wholly reductive claim here-I am not saying that for Nietzsche we are just 
like all the other animals. Such a claim cannot be true if one thinks that "all the 
other animals" as a contrast term with "'human beings" has no meaningful refer-
ence. All animals, Nietzsche seems to claim, need to forget in order to live: they 
need to do this in order to function biologically (processes of digestion conceived 
as forgetting) and in order to have any possible conscious psychic life (processes 
of"inpsychation" mentioned above). Many specific animals may not have psychic 
lives, and it might be that no other animals have cultivated the powers of memory 
that human beings wrought in the processes of moralization. These speculations 
and qualifications, however, do not imply that human forgetting is qualitatively 
different from the kind of forgetting vital to all animal life. 
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